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of Sanpete County, State of Utah
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APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the Seventh JuJicial District Court
of Sanpete County, State of Utah
Honorable F. W. Keller, Judge

STATEMENT OF Y:ACTS
The Appellant appeals from an Order of JuJgment made
by the District Court of Sanpete County, on the 19th day of
November. 1948.

The Respondent filed his complaint on

September 12, 19,17. The case was trieJ on the 29th and 70th

In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
lvfAC PETERSON, as Executor of the Last
\\fill and Testament of John S. Pt:tcrson,
Deceased,
Plt~inti{f and Re.r prmdeN!,

vs.
VERGA PETERSON ANDERSON,
Defendant cmd Appel!cm!
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days of October and on the 19th day of November, 1948, and
on the 19th day of November, 1948, the Court made and
entered its Order of Judgment in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant for the sums of $4,545.00 and $500.00,
respectively, together with interest upon said sums from May
31, 1946, and June 29, 1946, respectively. From this Order
and Judgment, the defendant appeals to the above entitled
Court.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
Comes now the defendant and appellant and makes
the following assignment of errors upon which she will rei y
for the reversal of the Judgment appealed from in this cause:
1. The Court erred in denying defendant and appellant

judgment in the trial of said action in the District Court, no
cause of action, and in entering judgment in favor of plaintiff
and respondent in said action.
2. The Court erred in its Entry of Judgment based upon
the proposed findings of Fact filed in said action, and that
said Findings of Fact are not supported by the evidence and
are insufficient upon which to base the Judgment, and that
said Judgment is void by reason thereof.
3. The Court erred in denying the defendant's :Motion for
a New Trial.
ARGUMENT
The evidence in this case shows, in effect, the following
facts:
That plaintiff was the son, and defendant, the daughter,
of John S. Peterson, deceased, he having died on February 22,
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1947. In checking over the property left by the decedent, the
children discovered that there had been some money drawn
out of the bank where he kept his account in Gunnison, and
in discussing the matter, the defendant herein advised them
that he had drawn the money out of the bank and paid off a
mortgage on the hotel which belonged to the defendant. The
plaintiff and his witnesses claimed that the defendant had
designated, at one time in the conversation, that the money
received by her was a loan, and later that she stateJ and maintained that it was a gift to her. Over this conversation, the
matters in question in this law suit arose, and upon this conversation alone does plaintiff bring his action and rest his case
upon said reported bare statement that the money was a loan,
and gives no credit whatever to the statements of the defendant
that the money was a gift to her.
It is evident from the evidence in this case that no evidence
of indebtedness growing out of a loan was taken by the decedent from the defendant herein at the time the money
was paid for her, and, therefore, there is no evidentiary
record in writing concerning the matter, the plaintiff relying
wholly upon the alleged statement of the defendant tlut the
money transferred to her from her father in his lifetime was
a loan. \Ve will briefly, at this point, state a summary of the
evidence on the question involved in the case.
The first witness testifying for the plaintiff was Billie
Peterson Clinger, a daughter of the decedent who, upon the
'question involved here, testified as follows: That her father,
in July and in November of 19'16, when she visitec! him at
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Gunnison, Utah, was living in the hotel with Verga (who is
the defendant herein) and that she was taking care of him
at the time of said visits; that in 1944 the decedent had given
the defendant a deed to the hotel and that all of the children
of the decedent so understood (Tr. 4); that the balance of
the children were happy that their father was being cared for
by the defendant herein; that in checking over the bank accounts and books taken from the decedent's effects, they found
some check stubs missing in the books (T r. 5).
That Vance, a brother, had taken over the store belonging
to the decedent in January, 1946 (Tr. 6).
That in the conversation, and apparently in the discussion
with reference to the money, the defendant stated that she knew
where the money went; !~at -~~r. father loaned it to her to pay
off the mortgage; that a short time thereafter she stated to them
that it was a gift to her and not a loan (Tr. 7). The witness
again stated that the defendant had referred to the money
received from the decedent as a loan (Tr. 11). When the
witness was asked if the defendant stated that the $600.00
item was loaned to her by the decedent, her reply was "that
was my understanding of it" (Tr. 15). She does not say the
defendant so stated.
Jessie Sprott,.called as a witness for the plaintiff, testified
as follows: That in April and November of 1946, she visited
her father; that at that time, he was living at the hotel and
was being taken care of by the defendant (Tr. 16). That at
the discussion about the money involved some of them were
present and some of them had gone to their homes (Tr. 17).
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That when they found a check missing in the check book, the
defendant was not present (Tr. 17). The witness does not
know whether the defendant was present at any of the conversations because her father had died and she was upset (Tr.
19). That the defendant claimed the money was a gift to her
(Tr. 22). The witness does not know whether any other
sums were given, save and except the $4,500.00 or whether
any other item was discussed at all that night (Tr. 23). That
the defendant had stated that she took the check stubs and
cancelled checks from the check books so that she would have
evidence that her mortgage was paid. When asked upon crossexamination to repeat the statement made by the defendant
concerning the $4,500.00 check, or to state what was said about
the matter by anyone, the witness stated that she could not
remember, and that she could not state what was said (Tr. 24).
That the statement made by the defendant that the money
was a gift, was made at the horae in the presence of the family
(Tr. 25).
Veyda Peterson Pardoe, a witness for the plaintiff, testified that the dece~!ent, wl1c~ she saw him in November, 1946,
was living at the hotel with the defendant (Tr. 2G). Tlut
Verga, the defendant, took care of him at said place; that
Verga was giving him good care, and was doing her best to
care for him; that she was good about seeing that he had good
meals, clean bedding, and that he was personally clean; that it
was hard for him to get in and out of the tub to Ltkc a bath,
and that the defendant had a shower put in for him (Tr. 27).
That the defendant stated that her father had made a loan

to her

to pay off the mortgage; that the money was given to
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her to pay off the mortgage, and that it was loaned to her;
that she stated that the money was a gift to her, but that was
after she said it was a loan (Tr. 31).
Mac Peterson, the plaintiff, called as a witness on his own
behalf, testified as follows: That he saw the decedent in
January, 1946, the last time, and he was living at the hotel
with the defendant (Tr. 41). That the defendant was taking
care of him while he was living at the hotel (Tr. 42). That the
defendant made a statement that her dad had loaned her that
money to pay off the mortgage of the Gunnison Hotel; that
the money was paid in the latter part of January, 1946, about
a year before the decedent's death (Tr. 63). The witness
was asked if he had found any entries in the ledger or in the
account books pertaining to such an item, and he replied that
he did not; that the witness found out that the decedent had
made a check for $500.00 on May 27, 1946 (Tr. 64). That
the witness saw a cashier's check for the amount of $500.00
(Tr. 65). The witness testified that the defendant told them
that the money was a gift (Tr. 70). The witness testified that
since the time he signed the complaint that he had found out
from the books that there were a number of items of money
that came in to the decedent as collection on accounts that
were never banked in the bank (Tr. 73).

C. E. Anderson, a witness called for the defendant, was
sworn and testified that he is the cashier of the Gunnison Valley
Bank; that he was familiar with a release of mortgage dated
January 29, 1946; that he signed the release as a Notary Public,
notarizing the signature of I. Overfelt (T r. 79). That he
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knows the signature of John S. Peterson and the signature of
I. Overfelt; that the Release of Mortgage was executed on the
date it bears; that the check paying off the mortgage was made
in the handwriting of Mr. Overfelt and signed by John S.
Peterson, which papers were introduced in evidence (Tr. 80).
Charles Rasmussen, a witness for and on behalf of the
defendant, was sworn and testified that he was a Director
of the Gunnison Valley Bank, and was now President of the
Bank, and had been for four or five years; that he had been
a Director of the bank for many years and had had business
transactions with John S. Peterson (Tr. 82). That he had
seen him practically every day and had rented property from him
for 21 years from 1917 to 1938 (Tr. 83). That he was always
alert in his mind and knew what he was doing in a business
way (Tr. 84).
Deliliah Jensen, a witness called for the defendant, testified
as follows: That she saw JohnS. Peterson, the decedent, at the
hotel practically every day (Tr. 87). That she lnd heard
conversations between the decedent and the defendant and had
heard statements that the decedent had made to the dfendant
(Tr. 88). That upon one occasion, when she and the defendant
and John S. Peterson were present, she was wallpapering the
bedroom when he came home. That was in the latter part of
February, 1946; that when he came in, she commenced kidding
with him because she had known him for many years; that
she said to him "you are fixing it up Mr. Peterson," and he
replied, "Yes we are fixing it up; I gave Verga the money to
pay off the mortgage so that she could have it nice. r d rather
not, I don't want a mortgage over my head and I don't want
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a mortgage on the house that I am living in." (Tr. 87B) He
further said "it is my money and I can do with it the way I want
to. If I want to give it away, I can, this has been my business
and there is nothing that I would rather see fixed up nice than
this hotel." (Tr. 88 and 89B) That this conversation took
place in the hotel in the decedent's room; that one day when
a Mrs. Worthen was present with her and the defendant and
the decedent, that the defendant was telling the other women,
Mrs. Worthen, that her dad gave her money to pay off the mortgage and that the decedent sat right there and he said yes that he
did; that the decedent was sure thrilled with having a home like
he had it, and that he told her so on his birthday on June 8, 1946
(Tr. 89). That at the time Verga was there and had made a nice
big cake; that he had given some of it to his dog, and he stated
that he was glad that the dog could have some and he thought
more of him than his family. That was on June 8, 1946 (Tr.
90). That there were many similar conversations along the
same line (Tr. 90).
Le Rita Worthen, called as a witness for the defendant,
testified as follows: That on January 30, 1946, she was in
the Gunnison Hotel when Mrs. Jensen was present, and that
Verga was there and Vrga stated "don't you think I have a
pretty good dad?" to which the witness replied "Yes," and
Verga said as follows: "he has given me money to pay the
mortgage off so that I am happier than I have been for a long
long time." The witness said "I wish you were my dad," and he
replied "well, this is the nicest home I have had for many
years, and I feel like I should do something for Verga, for I
have tried to help the boys (Tr. 4).
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13ob Anderson, a witness for the defendant, testified as
follows: That he was a student at the University of Utah,
and that he was home in 1946, and at the dinner table, his
father had said to the decedent that his Mother had told
them about paying off the mortgage, and he said to the
decedent "Verga tells me that you paid off our mortgage,"
and he asked the decedent why he paid it off (T. p. 96). That
the deceased answered by saying that the reason he paid it
off was because he did not want a mortgage on the roof over
his head, and that he might as well help Verga as give it all
to the boys, and then his Mother, Verga, asked the decedent
if she should tell the rest of the family about it and he answered
"No," that it was none of their business and he did not owe
any of them a cent, and that she should tell them when the
right time came; that that was all he had said about the matter

(T. p. 97).
Leonard Anderson, called as a witness on behalf of the
defendant, testified as follows: That he is the husband of
the defendant, Verga Peterson Anderson; that he was acquainted with the deceased in his lifetime; that at a certain
time he asked the deceased how he came to pay the mortgage
on the hotel, and the decedent answered him by saying he
did not want a mortgage on the roof over his head; that he
wanted to help Verga out a little bit, and he had the money
and that he thought he had better do that inasmuch as he did
not want to give it all to the boys (T. p. 98).
Verga Peterson Anderson, the defendant, testi!i.cd as
follows: That at the time the family met together after the
decedent's burial, they had a conversation relative to the money
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in question in this case (Tr. p. 102). That at said conversation,
while they were having dinner, there was a quarrel about
what became of certain monies that had belonged to the
decedent, and that Merrill had accused Vance of taking the
money; that they were sore at Vance over the store proposition
so while this conversation was going on, the defendant decided
to tell them about the money her Father had given her, and
she told them the truth about the matter, that her Dad had
given her the money to pay the mortgage off and that the
reason she is now in a law suit was because she had told the
truth, and after considerable bickering, the crowd separated
and the next morning they got in touch with the defendant
and requested her to go to the bank and borrow money and
pay the money back which had been given her which she refused
to do, stating that her Father had given it to her, and that she
did not owe anyone of them a dime, and that Vance said to
all of them that if they would pay off all the money that the
deceased had given them through the years, it could all be
put in the bank and split up, and the defendant replied that
the deceased had given her the money, and that she did not
owe one of them a dime, at which time Mac suggested that
they get Lew Larson and repeat both sides of the story to
him, and whatever h!s decision was would be accepted; that
on Wednesday afternoon they went to see Mr. Larson and
told him their side of the story and on the following morning
Mr. Larson came down and they all held Court over to the
house (Tr. p. 104). That they held a meeting, all members
being present, and that each side told their story to Mr.
Larson, and he stated as follows: "I think this girl has earned

.
-f.

13

···:: every dini.e she has," and the rest of the family became sore
·~..::and said that they would fight it out in Court; that they then
:held no further conversation with the defendant, but ostra;:cized her from the family, and shut the door in her face;
that they then went ahead and sold the things out of the
house and disposed of the property and never consulted
her further about anything (Tr. p. 105).
From the foregoing it will readily be seen that there
is no evidence whatever concerning any loan transaction from
;· the decedent to the defendant; that is, there is no evidence
to establish a loan by any act or statement of the decedent
made in his lifetime or of a~1y other witness concerning
any transaction between the decedent and the defendant in
decedent's lifetime; no papers of any sort indicating any
agreement upon a loan between the said parties, and there is
evidence in the record to show that the decedent, in his
lifetime, did not claim the money delivered to the defendant
as a loan, but his statements, as testified to by the witnesses,
proves conclusively that the money was a gift and was given
to the defendant to pay off the mortgage on the property in
which the decedent lived, and in his own words, for the
reason that he did not desire to live in property that was
covered by a mortgage. This leaves us, for consideration,
as the only evidence in the case, the alleged statement of the
defendant that her Father had loaned her the money, said
statment allegedly having been made at the time of the
meeting of the family after the burial of the decedent, and
it will be noted that all of the testimony given concerning this
transaction is to the effect that immediately after the alleged

'''·
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statement of lo~b, ana at the same time, and in the same
<;on~ersation, th~ defendant asserted that the money 111
question was given to her as a gift from her Father.
And this is not an unusual circumstance when considered
m the light of the fact that the defendant had taken the
decedent and made a home for him and kept him comfortable,
taking care of his every want and need in his old age anJ
declining years.
When all of the circumstances as they existed, as revealed
by the evidence, are taken into consideration, it would be a
natural human thing for the decedent to do to have consideration for the people who were furnishing him housing
and taking care of his every want and need, to want to
reimburse them in some way, and when the life of the decedent
is reviewed it can cause no emotional upset of one's mind
when he requests that the pl2ce in which he lives should not
be burdened with a mortgage but that it should be clear,
and, of course, it was his money and he had a right to do
with it as he saw fit.
This merely shows unquestionably that the preponderance
of the evidence in this case is in favor of the defendant and
against the plaintiff.
In support of our position we submit the following
argument and citations.

[{

It will be noted that the matter at issue concerns only
the proposition of whether the money paid in the discharge
of the mortgage upon the property was a loan or a gi:t.
J

..
.,. ' \....

.... ,
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The appeal, as taken, rests upon the propos1t10ns that
the judgment and findings are not supported by and are contrary to the evidence, and that the plaintiff failed to support
his allegation of a loan by a preponderance of the evidence,
and in fact, failed to establish so much as a prima facie case
against the defendant, when all of the evidence is considered,
and particularly the evidence adduced by the defendant in
the trial of said cause.
In the first place, a judgment must be supported by the
findings of fact as required by the Utah Code, 104-26-3.
"Under this section written findings of fact and conclusions
of law, separately stated, must be made and ftled before any
judgment can be entered. They are the foundations of the
judgment and are as necessary to precede any judgment as
a verdict in case of trial by jury. There is no presumption
in the absence of fmdings." Reich v. Rebellion Silver Mining
Company, 3 Utah 254, 2 P 703.
There is also the requirement of the law that the findings
must be properly supported by the evidence in order for the
judgment to stand. "The requirements of this section ( 10426-3) is just as essenti·1l in equity as in a law case. A judgment
rendered on no findings, or not upon sufficient, or proper
findings to support it, has no more validity in equity than
at law." In re Thompson's Estate, 72 Utah 17, 35, 269 P. 103.
The judgment of the trial court, being a conclusion of
law based on the findmgs, cannot itself be supported by an
alleged finding of fact which is identical to the conclusions
itself, and unsupported by the necessary findings of fact. "The
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court's finding must be of fact and not a conclusion of law;
that is, the court must specifically find the facts with regard
to the matters and then draw his conclusion from the facts
found." Brown vs. Johnson, 43 Utah 1, 134 P 590, 46 LRA
(NS) 1157.
A failure on the part of the trial court to adhere to this
rule operates to defeat a party's right to appeal ond suppresses
those basic rights provided by these rules of procedure in our
judicial system. "Where a case is tried to the court without
a jury, the court should find the facts upon every issue, either
affirmatively or negatively, as the evidence may be, and thus
give the defeated party an opportunity to assail the findings
as not being supported by the evidence." Thomas v. Clayton
Piano Co., 47 Utah 91, 151 P 543.
The present appeal rests mainly upon the contention that
the judgment of the trial court should be reversed because,
"The trial court should not make findings of fact where there
is no evidence to support them. If it does so, judgment
thereon will be reversed." Hathaway v. United Tintic Mines
Co., 42 Utah 520, 132 P 388.

\

Likewise, if there is evidence to support them, then said
finding should be supported by a statement thereof. It being
contended by the defendant that a finding of a loan is a legal
conclusion, and not itself a finding of fact. Finclin~s of
fact involved in the present issue must relate to the elements
which make up such a conclusion, namely:
1. Appropriate contractual intent on the part of both
parties to the transaction.
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2. The existence of a valid loan agreement.
3. The delivery of the money with the necessary intent.
Since a loan seriously cannot be said to exist unless these
three elements are present, to adjudge that a loan does exist
in the absence of a specific affirmative finding on each of these
three elements would be contrary to law and reason, a circumvention of the requirement of section 104-26-3 of the
Utah Code and in violation of the precedent set forth above.
The plaintiff in this case alleges that the transaction in
question was a loan. The defendant denies this, saying that
the transaction was a gift.
It goes without saymg that the plaintiff, the movmg
party, in alleging the transaction to be a loan, has the burden
of proving it by a preponderance of the evidence. "The
burden of proof is upon the party asserting the affirmative
of an issue, using the latter term in the larger sense and as
including any negative proposition which such party might
have to show. If he alleges a fact that is denied, he must
establish it. He is the actor, and as such remains so throughout
the case as to the allegations which he makes, or rather must
make. Having alleged the truth of a matter in issue, he must
prove it. The party denying his allegations cannot have this
burden at any time during the trial." 216 P 691, 31 ALR 14!J1.
The plaintiff must fail to recover if he fails to discharge
this burden or if the evidence is equally balanced. 30 Utah
453, 85 P. 1002.
Thus it is obvious that the plaintiff, alleging a loan,
must prove it. "When an action is brought to acquue
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money alleged to have been loaned by plaintiff to defendant
under an oral contract, and defendant claims the money as
a gift, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the alleged oral
agreement to repay." Mace v. Tingey, 106 Utah 42, 149 P2d,
Payne v. Williams, 62 Colo. 86, 160 P 196. And ordinarily
there is no presumption against a gift. Mace v. Tingey, supra,
Jackson v. Lamar 68 Wash. 38'5, 121 P 8'57.
Again from the case of Mace v. Tingey: "The undisputed
record reveals that in September, 1937, Elizabeth Emma Dyer,
herein called deceased, an elderly spinster, entered tbe home
and employment of defendant as a domestic; that in November,
1938, due to a combination of defendant's financial condition
and the impaired state of health of deceased, such employment
terminated, but deceased continued to live in defendant's
home without charge until her death in April, 1942, except
for a short time (six weeks) in 1941 when she was in a hospital.
Plaintiff contends that the court erred in admitting testimony
as to these facts and evidence shmving that duririg part of
that time, deceased was either practically an invalid or unable
to completely care for herself or to work, on the ground such
evidence was irrevalent and immaterial. \Vas such objection
well taken? Plaintiff refers us to no authority where this
point was involved, but the question is not one of first impression. Where, as here, the question is as to whether the
transaction was a loan or a gift, and neither party can testify
thereto, the circumstances under which the transaction took
place are certainly material in determining the intent of the
donor and the purpose for which the property \Vas turned
over. Testimony touching the motives, indecements, or
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reasons for the donor turning the property to the donee, rather
than the heirs is pertinent to the issues." Gilham v. French,
6 Colo. 196 2dP. St. Rep. 196; Nichols applied Evidence,
Vol. 3, p. 2383; "and is admissible for the purpose of sustaining
the probability that the gift was in fact made." 38 C.J.S. 867;
Sando v. Smith, 237 Ill. App. 570, 28 C.J. 674, and note 96.
"The relation of the parties, the sit'Uatior1 then existing, and
the circumstances under which the gift was made, including
the donor's previous life, habits and relations to others, as
well as the condition of the donor at the time of the gift
may be considered by the court;" Russell v. Langford, 135 Cal.
356, 67 P. 331; "so too evidence of friendly or affectionate
relations between the parties," Young v. Anthony, 104 NYS
87, 119 App .Div. 612; Smith v. Maine, 25 Barb. 33; Rhodes
v. Childs, 64 Pa. 18; "that the parties had resided together,"
Currie v. Langston, 92 Mont. 570, 16 P. (2d) 708; "and that
the donee had rendered service to the donor," Young v. Anthony
supra; 38 CJS 868, 28 CJ 674; "is admissible on the question
of motive and intent."
"Generally the donee has the burden of proving a gift."
Blackburn v. Jones, 59 Utah 558, 205 P. 582; Ward v. Ward,
94 Ore. 405, 185 P. 906. "But when an action is brought to
recover money alleged to have been loaned by plaintiff to
defendant under an oral contract, and defendant claims the
money was a gift, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the
alleged oral agreement to repay." Payne v. Williams, 62 Colo.
86, 160 P. 196. There is no evidence in the case at bar of any
agreement to repay. "Ordinarily there is no presumption against
a gift." Jackson v. Lamar, 67 Wash. 385, 121 P. 857. "There
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was here no witness who testified directly as to the transaction.
Plaintiff produced witnesses, beneliciaries under the will, or
relatives, who testified that defendant told them the money
-that she should have signed a note. The sowas a loan
called "dead man statute" (Subdivision 3 of Sec. 104-49-2
UCA 1943) was invoked by plaintiff to prevent defendant
t~stifying as to what actually occurred when the money
changed hands. Defendant, as a witness however, denied
making the statem'ents attributed to her by pl;intifis witnesses.
She offered a witness who corroborated her denial that she
had stated the money was a loan; another witness testitied
that deceased had told him she had given defendant the money."

and

Not only is the burden of proof on the plaintiff, but he
also must be first to proceed with his proof of the matter
alleged. This is true because the relationship of the parties
involved in this controversy, together with the surrounding
circumstances as found in the record, not only fail to raise
a presumption in favor of the plaintiff by placing the burden
of proceeding with the evidence on the defendant, but to
the contrary. The evidence contained in the record points
to the probability of a gift (Mace v. Tingey, supra.) The
record shows that defendant was the daughter of deceased,
that she cared for the deceased and helped to make a comfortable home for him, that deceased expressed his intention
that she should have the hotel, that the members of the family
all understood and were in agreement with an understand:ng
to that effect, and that a check signed by deceased discharged
a mortgage note of the daughter held by a bank on the
property given defendant by deceased. The record contains
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no evidence indicating discord or lack of love and affection_
between the daughter and deceased.
contains no evidence indicating discord or lack of love and
affection between the daughter and deceased.
These circumstances, as shown by the record, not only
do not help the plaintiff, but do raise a presumption in favor of
the defendant, namely, that the payment by deceased was a
gift to defendant. "A payment by a parent of a substantial
amount to discharge a debt for a child will be deemed prima
facie to be intended as an advancement or a gift." In re Wiese's
Estate, 270 N.W. 382; Morrison et al. v. Morrison et al., 96
S.\'V. 100; West et al. v. Becket al., 64 N.W. 599; In re Pickenbrack's Estate, 70 N.W. 1084, 26 A.L.R. 1146. And even
where the father, after payment of the mortgage, ta!ces an
assignment in blank of tbe mortgage and note (the record
in the instant case shows no disposition of the cancelled mortgage and note), such a payment is deemed an advancement
to the child." Johnston v. Eaton, 51 Kan. 708, 33 P. 597, "and
the clearest evidence is required to rebut this presumption."
Lewis v. Bowman, 113 Mont. 68, 121 P. 2d 162; Nailor v.
Nailor, 5 Mackay 93, 16 D.C. 93, appeal dismissed, 1888,
127 U.S. 787, 32 L.Ed. 331. Furthermore, "it is presumed
that advances made between parents and children are gifts, :1nd
such presumption prevails until the contrary is clearly established." In re Randall's Estate, 101 Colo. 249, 72 P. 2d 471;
J\furphy v. Murphy, 95 Iowa 271, 63 N.\'V. 697; Higham v.
Vanosdal, 125 Ind. 74, 25 N.E. 140; First Nat. Bank v. Keller,
122 N.J.Eg. 481, 194 A. 554.
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Consequently, with the burden of proof and the burden
of proceeding with the evidence being on the plaintiff, what
must he prove? !he payment of the money is admitted. The
plaintiff, then, must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that deceased intended to enter into a loan agreement with
the defendant, the existence of such agreement, and the payment of the money by deceased with said contractual intent.
Thus, in broad terms, the plaintiffs case depends on his proof
of deceased's intent. The intent of deceased, accordingly, is
the vital issue of fact upon which the findings and judgment
must depend.
And where, as here, the question is as to whether the transaction was a loan or a gift, and neither party can testify thereto,
the circumstances under which the transaction took place are
material in determining the intent of the donor.. Mace v.
Tingey, supra. Reference to such circumstances has been made
in the foregoing. The record contains evidence by way of the
testimony of deceased's children that there was a family understanding to the effect that defendant was to receive the hotel
in exchange for her service in caring and providing a home
for the deceased until his death. The members of the family
were in harmony with this understanding. The record further
shows that defendant did care and provide a home for deceased
until his death; also that imediately after completion of the
transaction in question the deceased declared what he had done
and for what purpose. There was no reference or indication
whatsoever in those statements that the transaction was a loan
or intended by deceased to be such. No such inference logically
can be drawn from those statements nor from the transaction
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itself. No reference was nude to an agreement with dc[enchni,
no refe·ence was made to repayment by defendant, and no
reference was made to the disposition of the cancelled note
and mortgage. The logical and only inference which can bC'
drawn from the transaction, the surrounding circumstances
and the statements of the deceased is that dece:J.sed intended
the payment to be a gift. ' · 't '
' '
The evidence in the record contains nothing which points
to a loan or which tends to prove facts from which a loan might
be inferred. Plaintiff has proved the irrelevant fact that almost
one year after the transaction occurred, defend:mt stated to
members of deceased's family that deceased had loaned her the
money. Because of the remoteness in time, such a statement
cannot be considered as part of the res gestate, thus of value
in proving the substance of the statement. Furthermore, can
such a bare and remote statement seriously be considered in an
attempt to determine the intent of deceased at the time of the
transaction. Such vidence is clearly incompetent for such a
purpose.
It is necessary also to consider the circumstances under
\\ hich the alleged admission was made. The record shows that
the members of deceased's family, in the course of compJing
the assets of the estate, discovered cert:1in unexphined financi:tl
matters. This, as the record clearly shows, c:1used the temper:;
and nerves of the members of the family to be strained and
gave rise to an exchange of words and accusations. It was
in this atmosphere that defendant made her statement. It is
clear that under such circumstances any words spoken by those
involved were necessarily hasty and without deliberation. It
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was an obvious attempt on the part of defendant to smooth the
troubled family waters, with little or no regard on her part of
the consequences of such a statement. Furthermore, the record
shows that within the space of very few minutes, defendant
retracted her former statement, and declared that the transaction
in fact was a gift from deceased. Under the circumstances,
little probative value can be attached to defendant's admission.
"Weight to be given admissions, whether oral or written, depends in great part on circumstances under which admission
was made." Christensen et al. v. Johnson, 90 Utah 27), _61
P. 2d 597. "If an admission, however, is to carry weight, it first
must be shown to have been made with deliberation." Mehr v.
Child et al., 61 P. 2d 624.
Other than this alleged admission by defendant, the recotd
is bare of any evidence whatsoever which might remotely refer
to a contractual intent on the part of deceased. Thus, we have
a case of plaintiff's position resting entirely upon the alleged
admission and in the face of all overwhelming circumstances
and testimony to the contrary. "Evidence of verbal declarations
of adverse party, uncorroborated by other facts or circumstances,
are not sufficient to sustain jury verdict or court finding upon
a vital issue." Comm. Importing Co. v. Wear eta!., 200 Wash.
156, 41 P. 2d 777.
No direct evidence was introduced at the trial concerning
the nature of the transaction. Resort was necessary, therefore,
to the surounding facts and circumstances. Mace v. Tin~~cy,
supra. The circumstances alone give rise to a presumption of
a gift, as stated above. There is ample testimony and facts in
the record to support this presumption. On the other side, the
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only evidence to support the notion of a loan is the uncorroborated statement by defendant which is remote in point of time
and incompetent by way of probative value on the issue of
decedent's intent.
It is clear that the plaintiff has failed to prove his allegation of a loan by a preponderance of the evidence. Not only
this, but plaintiff has failed completely to overcome the presumption of a gift, establish his prima facie case and place
the burden of proceeding with the evidence on the shoulders
of defendant.
The trial court itself states that the proof of the circum-/
stances under which defendant received the money was some-[
what vague. In the face of all these factors, can the judgment \
be allowed to stand? "Findings and judgments cannot rest
on conjecture and speculation," 195 P. 2d 574, "and must be
predicated upon definite and tangible supporting facts."
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P. 2d. 53. The plaintiff must fail "where plaintiff's undisputed
evidence from which essential fact is sought to be inferred
points with equal force to two things, one of which renders
the defendant liable and the other not." 89 P. 2d 490.
As to the duty of the Supreme Court in this regard, the
judgment of the trial court cannot stand. "When testimony preponderates on one side or the other in such way as to convince
the Supreme Court that the trial court erred, the trial court's
judgment will be reversed." Wilson v. Cunningham, 24 Utah
167, 67 P. 118. See also Jensen v. Howell, 75 Utah 64, 74; 282
P. 1034.

26
"The findings of the trial court also must be supported
by competent evidence if they are to stand." Harper v. Tri-State
Motors, Inc., 90 Utah 212, 222, 58 P. 2d 18, rehearing denied
90 Utah 226, 63 P. 2d 1056; Vadner v. Rozzelle, 88 Utah 162,
164, 45 P. 2d 561, rehearing denied 88 Utah 172, 54 P. 2d 1214;
Greco v. Gentile, 88 Utah 255, 53 P. 2d 1155.
It is clear, therefore, that the Supreme Court has the
power to vacate the findings of the trial court where the finJings
are manifestly against the clear weight of the evidence as to
indicate that it was not fairly or impartially considered by the
trial court, or that undue weight was given to portions of the
evidence, or that the trial court misconceived or misapplied the
evidence. In re Yowell's Estate, 75 Utah 312, 329, 285 P. 285.
We submit, therefore, that on the basis of the record, the
finding and judgment of the trial court must be reverscJ.
Respectfully submitted,
E. LEROY SHIELDS
Attorney for Defendtmt ttnd
_/lfiPellcmt.

